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1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORKx
3	COMMISSIONS IMPORT EXPORT S.A.
4	Plaintiff
5	v. 19 MC 00195 (KPF)
6	Remote Teleconference REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, et al.,
7	Defendants
8	x
9	New York, N.Y. February 16, 2022
10	4:20 p.m.
11	Before:
12	HON. KATHERINE POLK FAILLA
13	District Judge
14	APPEARANCES
15	GOULSTON & STORRS PC Attorneys for Plaintiff CHARLES R. JACOB, III
16	ISABEL SUKHOLITSKY
17	
18	ASHCROFT LAW FIRM LLC Attorneys for Defendant Republic of the Congo
19	MICHAEL SULLIVAN NATE BRENNAN
20	NAIE DRENNAN
21	NIXON PEABODY LLP
22	Attorney for Defendant Ecree LLC DANIEL A. SCHNAPP
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DEPUTY CLERK: Would counsel please state your names

3 for the record beginning with petitioner.

(In chambers; case called)

MR. JACOB: Good afternoon, your Honor. This is
Charles Jacob and Isabel Sukholitsky of Goulston & Storrs PC,
for the petitioner and judgment creditor, Commissions Import
Export.

THE COURT: Good afternoon to you, and thank you very much.

Representing the Republic of the Congo, please.

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes. Good afternoon, your Honor. This is Michael Sullivan. I'm joined by Nate Brennan of the Ashcroft Law Firm.

THE COURT: Sir, thank you very much. I understood from my law clerk that Mr. Brennan might not be on our docket at present. Will he be filing a notice of appearance in the near term or has he done so in the recent past?

MR. SULLIVAN: He'll do it in the near term.

THE COURT: I thank you.

And representing Ecree or Ecree, whose name I hear pronounced differently by everyone.

MR. SCHNAPP: Good afternoon, your Honor. It's Daniel Schnapp from Nixon Peabody. I hope your Honor is well. I have been using Ecree to pronounce my client's name.

THE COURT: I will do that then for this proceeding.

Thank you.

Let me begin by thanking you for your patience this afternoon. I have just come upstairs from a guilty plea proceeding with an incarcerated defendant who was produced later than we would have liked. So I do appreciate that. I don't like making people hold, and I know your time is valuable, but I do thank you for waiting for this.

So we are here this afternoon to discuss the possibility of motions to dismiss filed by each of the defendants. But I want to begin by speaking with Mr. Jacob because there's a bit of confusion that I know you didn't mean to foster in me, but I guess I would like to understand what is going on at the ICC? The parties are back and forth in their letters about whether there's something untoward going on, whether counsel is involved in anything. So please understand, try and make this as nonjudgmental as possible and as factual as possible.

Mr. Jacob, what's going on?

MR. JACOB: So what's going on, your Honor, is this:
We have two judgments in the Southern District of New York:
One entered in 2014 and one entered in 2017. They are based on two completely different arbitration awards. They're both very large. The 2014 judgment is 772 million. The 2017 judgment is 190 million, both far in excess of the value of the condominium at issue.

The Republic filed a proceeding seeking to impair us with the ICC, seeking to reopen one of the arbitrations. It has nothing to do with the other, so it is completely irrelevant here because we have a judgment far larger than the value of the condominium either way.

So I wanted to start by making clear that nothing that happens in this @Paris proceeding is going to affect this proceeding.

THE COURT: Mr. Jacob, please, excuse me, sir, and this is, again, the problems with having this by telephone.

What you're saying is the request to reopen that has been filed by the Republic of the Congo is a request to reopen as to the 2014 judgment and not the 2017 judgment?

MR. JACOB: Correct.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right. So do I -- I mean this in the nicest way. Do I care about the preopening of the proceeding from your perspective, sir?

MR. JACOB: No, you shouldn't. And to the extent we responded to Mr. Sullivan's letter suggesting that this has any kind of real importance, maybe we shouldn't have, your Honor, to be honest, because it has no importance. The other judgment is 190 million, and the condominium is believed to be worth 7 million, so we wanted to clarify that though. And I will just add that the allegation made by the Republic is that the dean of international arbitration, literally the most respected

international arbitrator in the world, took, they allege, Rolex watches and cash from my client, basically; and that is obviously being extremely sharply disputed both by the distinguished arbitrator and by my client, and we think they have no chance of getting this reopened, but at the end of the day, it doesn't matter for the reason I said.

THE COURT: Okay. There was a bit of circularity to that because you began by telling me at this time didn't matter, then you told me what "it" was, and now you're telling me again that it doesn't matter, but I do understand that.

Let me ask a different question, please, Mr. Jacob, one of the reasons that I have premotion conferences is because I want to see, for example, if I can persuade parties not to file motions. My belief, without even having heard from Mr. Sullivan or Mr. Schnapp, is that I will not be so successful, but is there any belief on the petitioner's part that an amended petition for the turnover would be useful, would forestall any of this litigation, or do you believe that the petition as it now stands is absolutely appropriate and that motion practice will reveal nothing else?

MR. JACOB: We could amend it, your Honor, because we have had discovery in these post-judgment proceedings, very important discovery of the condominium board that showed without question that what we allege in the petition; that the condominium was bought for the daughter of the President of the

Republic. In fact, was bought for the daughter of the President of the Republic. That's what the documents show very clearly. We could add evidentiary detail in an amended petition and do that quickly.

We would also refer it to the U.S. Government's proceeding which was begun after this one was in Miami, which had absolutely parallel allegations to our allegations that the president did virtually the exact same thing for his son with respect to a luxury condominium apartment in Miami. These allegations can easily be added.

You know, this is a turnover proceeding, and I do think Rule 12(b)(6) can be applicable. If your Honor is going to look at the pleading in a strict 12(b)(6) sense, we could certainly add things we've learned since this proceeding started, yes, we could.

THE COURT: I'm not saying you have to, sir. Please don't read into that. I just want to understand. I did read your opposition to the motion. Excuse me for a moment. That's my phone, and I won't be able to turn it off.

I will hear from the respondents in a moment to see if there is opposition to amendment, but I understand where things are.

Mr. Jacob, before I turn again to the respondents, is there anything else you'd like me to know?

MR. JACOB: Not unless your Honor has specific

questions about why we think their motions to dismiss would be meritless, but we addressed those topics in our January 17 letter, so I'll hold off on that unless your Honor has specific questions.

THE COURT: I do not at this time. Thank you.

Mr. Sullivan, may I turn to you, or is it Mr. Brennan?

MR. SULLIVAN: That would be Michael Sullivan, your

Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

Mr. Sullivan, let me begin with what I'm hoping is an easier question. Is there any proscription on the petitioner amending its petition for turnover before your motions are filed?

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, certainly, your Honor, I would much rather, you know, think about one motion to dismiss as opposed to multiple motions to dismiss. And if I thought that there was some opportunity for the petitioner to cure the defects in the petition, then I think I would be less inclined to oppose an amended motion at this point in time. But I think, your Honor, that there are, you know, some deficiencies that cannot be cured based on the allegations that are being raised in the petition.

THE COURT: Sir, I'm neither agreeing nor disagreeing with you, but I think you and I are on the same page in that I'd rather do this motion to dismiss practice once and not

twice, but I appreciate what you're saying.

Let me understand, sir, because you've now seen the opposition filed by petitioner. Tell me why it's not correct.

MR. SULLIVAN: I think for a number of reasons, your Honor. I think the petitioner misunderstands or misstates the law in several respects. I'd like to really just identify three in particular, your Honor.

One is the issue regarding immunity.

The other is the deficiencies generally in the pleading in the petition.

And the third is this issue about turnover under CPLR 5225(b).

If I can start with just immunity for a second, your Honor, as the Court knows the Republic of Congo has disclaimed any interest in the condo or the funds that led to the purchase of the condo, and it still does.

However, your Honor, even if the funds that gave rise to the purchase of the condo was successfully imputed to the Republic of the Congo, under 18 U.S.C. 1610, your Honor, the petition would be subject to a motion to dismiss based on immunity.

Since there are no allegations in the complaint that the property was used for any commercial activity by the Republic of Congo in the United States, and there can never be any allegations, your Honor, because there are none in that

effect, and we cited in our premotion conference letter, your Honor, E M Limited v. the Republic of Argentina. There is also the Walthers v. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, your Honor. 651 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 2011). It's a Second Circuit case that talks about the need for commercial activity beyond just a waiver of immunity.

So as courts have noted, even when a foreign state has waived immunity, it does not allow creditors to seize and attach every asset of a debt in the United States, only those assess that are used for commercial activity in the United States.

As I mentioned at outset of the immunity issue, your Honor, there are no allegations in the complaint that allege the property was used for commercial activity by the Republic of Congo. In fact, the allegations are inapposite. The allegations are the funds were stolen from the Republic of Congo and found their way here. so They would never be able to cure the issue about immunity.

THE COURT: Mr. Sullivan, I will ask you to pause right there, and I thank you.

What about the argument that is made by Mr. Jacob that there is a different exception, the one set forth in 1610(a)(6) which is an exception to immunity, I'm told, where the judgment is based on an order confirming an arbitral award rendered against the foreign state.

MR. SULLIVAN: That is clearly an exception to the immunity, your Honor, but that is not the only step that needs to be taken. So the first step, obviously, is whether or not there's immunity. The second step is whether or not the property that's being claimed for purposes of seizure or attachment is for commercial activity. So it is really a two-step process. So even nation states that have waived immunity in the United States based on one of those other exceptions does not put all their assets in peril in the United States.

And here Mr. Jacob argues not that the Republic of Congo has purchased this property or put these funds. He claims that these funds were stolen from the Republic of Congo. We certainly dispute that allegation as well, your Honor, and it gets to the issue of his pleading and the source of what he's using for his allegations.

So it's really a two-step process, your Honor. It's identifying the exception to immunity and then determining whether or not the property that is being seized and attached is being used for commercial activity in the United States by the nation state.

THE COURT: I see. Sir, tell me, please, the second hurdle that you believe is insurmountable are the deficiencies in the pleading. Now, perhaps certain of these might be remedied by repleading, but let me hear about those you believe

will not.

MR. SULLIVAN: I don't know whether or not you will, if ever, be able to, your Honor, but obviously if you read the pleadings, it's information and belief based principally on the allegations from the *Global Witness* story. And as we mentioned, your Honor, on several occasions, *Global Witness* is a self-described campaigner, and it's not an investigative journalist outfit. The article that was published in the *New York Times*, even the *New York Times* acknowledges it didn't confirm the *Global Witness* report.

And the *Global Witness* report was a campaign piece. It was titled "Trump's Luxury Condo: A Congolese State

Affair." Our argument, your Honor, in a motion to dismiss will be that the *Global Witness*—sourced allegations do not satisfy the pleading requirements for petitioner's claim under either

D.C.L. 276, which, notwithstanding Mr. Jacob's claim that we raised 9(b) pleading requirements under 276 in bad faith. In fact, the law is clear that 276 does need to meet the 9(b) particularity pleading requirements as it relates to fraud, so they're certainly deficient in the complaint.

And even under the second D.C.L. 273-A, your Honor, were not subject to 9(b) higher pleading requirements. And for the record, your Honor, we never said in our premotion conference letter that 273-A did need to meet the higher pleading requirements under 9(b), it still falls far short of

what is needed to satisfy plausibility requirements under Twombly.

THE COURT: I see. And then your turnover argument, please, sir?

MR. SULLIVAN: Your Honor, this is pretty straightforward. It is certainly in our premotion conference letter. I reviewed Mr. Schnapp's letter on behalf of Ecree, and I think he raised it as well. But the petitioner's request for turnover is under CPLR 5225(a), and as we pointed out, 5225(b) -- not (a), your Honor -- applies to personal property, not real property. And Mr. Jacob's response is, again, claiming that we're frivolously raising these arguments, and his petition references Section 5236. But, your Honor, we would argue 5236 is unhelpful at this stage because that section of the CPLR relates only to the process of a sale, not an authority to turn the property over.

It is for those reasons and what we've outlined in our premotion conference letter, your Honor, we think would be the basis of our motion to dismiss.

THE COURT: Mr. Sullivan, two points: Number one is given the substance of the discussions you and I are having, I am going to ask you, please, to obtain a transcript of this conference in the ordinary course so that I have it when the motions are filed, and I thank you in advance for doing that.

Number two is, I think you're going to be able to

answer this question quickly, but I have no way to persuade you not to file this motion. Is that correct, sir?

MR. SULLIVAN: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Of course.

Mr. Schnapp, let me hear from you as well, please.

MR. SCHNAPP: Your Honor, I don't have much to add. I don't think that we would -- in addition to the Republic, I also think that we would not persuaded, respectfully. I think that our grounds are more or less set forth in the premotion letter. I think that a number of them probably would be echoed by what the Republic just said.

I think that there is -- obviously, we agree that the basis of the petition to the extent that it relies upon the Global Witness article, it raises a number of Twombly issues as well as the fact that it does not meet in its current state what we consider to be the appropriate pleading standards.

So, for those reasons as well as the reasons we've set forth in our correspondence to your Honor, we would like to proceed with our motion to dismiss.

THE COURT: Mr. Schnapp, let me ask a related question. It was the first question I asked of Mr. Sullivan. Given my own disinclination for two rounds of motion practice, is there any legal reason that I may not permit Mr. Jacob to amend his petition for turnover?

MR. SCHNAPP: As far as a legal reason, your Honor,

the only thing I would think of is the possibility that he would otherwise need to move for it, but I understand what the Court is saying, which is the Court should not have to be burdened with multiple motions to dismiss. So I think that probably trumps whatever that requirement is, and I think your Honor is probably predisposed to providing that leave to petitioner in the first instance.

So, based upon that, I don't really have a good reason why the petition should not be amended. I can't obviously speak for my client out of hand, but I would ask that perhaps we'd have a very short period of time just to confirm with our client that there is no objection, but I can't think of any other reason offhand, your Honor.

THE COURT: And I do appreciate that. I certainly don't want you to run afoul of anything with your client. But I don't see that there is a problem with me ordering the amendment if Mr. Jacob wishes to amend. So I think what I will instead is I will order it, and if in the next day or so you find a legal authority that tells me that I can't and it's reversible error, you will let me know.

Mr. Jacob, I cannot prevent -- as hard as I've tried, I cannot persuade either Mr. Sullivan or Mr. Schnapp not to file a motion to dismiss. So tell me, please, sir, what time period would you like to amend your petition, if indeed you wish to do so?

Mr. Jacob, you're coming in quite faintly. You may have to unmute yourself.

MR. JACOB: Sorry. We would like two weeks, your Honor, which should be plenty of time for us. We would also like leave to take discovery, notwithstanding the proposed motions to dismiss. This is a post-judgment proceeding, so it's not like the typical civil action where we are just kind of on the first round. The Republic, as is in our papers, is already in contempt of court in Judge Leon's court in the District of Columbia at the rate of \$80,000 a week because they would not provide post-judgment discovery there.

They're here. Mr. Sullivan is here. We still ask why if the Republic has no interest in the apartment, as they say, they're spending so much time and effort defending this case.

The main point is that judgment creditors get post-judgment discovery as a matter of course, including discovery that's broad that traces the funds of a recalcitrant sovereign judgment debtor, as the Argentina decisions of the Second Circuit and other courts made clear.

So we would propose amending within two weeks but also within two weeks serving requests for production of documents, depositions notices and interrogatories to the respondents.

THE COURT: One moment, please. Thank you for reminding me, Mr. Jacob, that that was an open issue. I did understand that, and I really should have asked Mr. Sullivan

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and Mr. Schnapp to address that issue, so I will do that now. Thank you.

Mr. Sullivan, excuse me for coming back to you, sir. Your position on discovery given the argument that Mr. Jacob just made.

Your Honor, we would oppose discovery MR. SULLIVAN: We think that even the amended complaint will at this stage. be subject to a motion to dismiss, and certainly while the Court is trying to be efficient and limit cost of the parties, and I greatly appreciate that, but it's a complete fishing expedition on the part of Mr. Jacob at this point in time based on the allegations of the complaint, your Honor. Court's allowed an amended petition, and will allow that to proceed in the ordinary course, and give us an opportunity to review it. Absent something extraordinary being in there, your Honor, it's likely we will be revisiting with a motion to dismiss, but we respectfully ask that discovery be stayed until we have an opportunity to review and respond to the amended complaint.

The petitioner is not in any jeopardy in terms of not getting discovery, your Honor, because, as I understand it, the property is still owned by Ecree, and the Court has instructed Ecree not to sell the property, but I'll defer to Mr. Schnapp on that.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Sullivan, just given what

I'm hearing about a couple of weeks to amend. So, imagining — and let me just put this down, I will give a little bit more time, March 4 will be the date that I will expect the amended petition to be filed.

How much time would you need for a motion? Are you looking, sir, for example, for April 4 or something greater or lesser than that?

MR. SULLIVAN: I think April 4 would be fine, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Schnapp, turning to you, sir, let me hear your position on discovery and your position on an April 4 filing date.

MR. SCHNAPP: I would agree with counsel for the Republic for the reasons stated that it would be, I think, highly inappropriate to proceed with discovery at this time. It's true that the apartment is currently subject to the Court's order. It is going to remain subject to the Court's order. There is no prejudice to the petitioner. Clearly, if the motions are successful, there will be no need for discovery. And as for the April 4 date, I certainly have no objection to that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JACOB: Your Honor, if I could be you heard further on discovery?

THE COURT: Is this Mr. Jacob?

1 MR. JACOB: Yes, it is, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Go ahead, sir.

MR. JACOB: If these judgments were judgments that had been entered in your court after typical civil proceedings, we would not be in the position of the judgment debtor blocking discovery. Judgment creditors are absolutely entitled to post-judgment discovery. So what the respondents are trying to do is say because we're looking for turnover of one particular asset, we don't get post-judgment discovery, and that is completely illogical, and, I would submit, not the law.

If your Honor had entered a billion dollars of judgments against respondents like respondents here, or defendants in a civil case, let's say, you would not be denying the judgment creditor, creditor discovery. And I don't believe that it's right for you to deny discovery here. We should be allowed to proceed.

The turnover proceeding is an aspect of the overall situation in this court where there's a billion dollars of judgments against the Republic, and we are entitled to discovery.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir. I'm going to ask the parties to just wait on hold for a moment. I just want to think about the issue that the parties are raising about discovery. I'll get back to you momentarily. Please hold.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Counsel, I thank you very much for your patience.

I am inclined to let discovery proceed during the pendency of the motion, and that is in part because of the history of noncompliance that has been outlined in petitioner's letters, and that is because irrespective of the resolution of the turnover motion, it occurs to me that Mr. Jacob would be very likely permitted to take discovery as a judgment creditor of the Republic and of Ecree. So I am going to allow discovery, and I will permit the requests that Mr. Jacob outlined earlier to be filed.

Just so that I can identify finally the schedule for the motions in this case, this is what I propose: March 4 for the amended petition. April 4 for each of the respondent's opening briefs. May 18 for a single response from petitioner to the two motions, because I think there are many overlapping issues and facts. If that means that the petitioner needs to go over slightly the page limits, I will allow it. I would think that 35 pages would be sufficient, and you'll tell me and see what I say if you think more is needed. And then June 3 for any reply brief.

So that's the schedule that I'm setting. Discovery will go forward. As always, I welcome the opportunity to try and get folks to resolve this, but I don't think that's going to happen at this time.

Mr. Jacob, those are all the issues I wanted to address today. Anything else from you, sir?

MR. JACOB: I don't think so, your Honor. Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Sullivan, anything else today, sir?

MR. SULLIVAN: Your Honor, just on the issue of discovery, I'm concerned that we're going to be back before you in terms of what Mr. Jacob is going to be seeking for purposes of discovery, and I know that he was trying to persuade the Court this is a typical judgment debtor that should be subject to an examination, you know, based on a matter that's been litigated in a judgment against the other debtor in the United States. I know the Court knows this is an arbitration in a foreign jurisdiction that was registered in the United States, and the petition is about seeking the condominium in New York.

Knowing how Mr. Jacob has responded up to this point in time in terms of our communications, I'm suspecting we're going to see some broad-based discovery of a judgment debtor in the United States. And I have not researched the point, your Honor, but the question becomes whether there's any authority to do that type of broad-based discovery based on a turnover request for an asset in New York. So I'm wondering, your Honor, if the Court might limit discovery just to the context of this issue about the immunity claim that would be raised

that the property is not subject to some type of execution or attachment because it's not used for commercial purposes by the Republic of Congo.

THE COURT: Mr. Sullivan, I'm not inclined at this time to limit discovery in the manner that you've suggested. You began this section of your discussion by noting a concern that we would be back before me again. I fully expect that we will be, sir, and so I imagine there will be fights about the scope of discovery. And by the time Mr. Jacob formulates and serves his requests, you and I will be better researched on those issues.

So I'm not going to limit them here in this conversation. Would I limit them in response to letter motion practice from the parties? Perhaps. And I guess we'll both be looking for that, but thank you.

MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Schnapp, anything else today, sir?

MR. SCHNAPP: No, your Honor. I appreciate the Court's time.

THE COURT: Of course.

Again, I thank you all for your patience this afternoon. I wish you safety and continued safety and continued good health in this pandemic. We are adjourned. Thanks so much.

(Adjourned)